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 1 
Abstract 
What people believe to be the economic, moral and social consequences of the welfare 
state is a nearly neglected subject in studies on welfare state legitimacy. This is quite re-
markable given that the welfare state is often criticized substantially for its (alleged) eco-
nomic and moral consequences. This article contributes to the field of welfare legitimacy 
by offering a first description of people’s perceptions of a series of welfare state conse-
quences, and extended analyses of the structural and cultural determinants. Data from a 
2006 Dutch survey show that in the eyes of a large majority of the Dutch the positive social 
consequences of the welfare state outweigh the negative economic and moral conse-
quences. Strikingly, structural variables, like age, income and educational level, which 
may indicate peoples’ social risks and related personal interest in the provisions of the 
welfare state, play a minor explanatory role, if at all, compared to welfare relevant values 
and attitudes. The person that is most pessimistic about the economic and moral conse-
quences, and least optimistic about the social consequences, tends to be female, rightist, 
more authoritarian, less convinced of the deservingness of welfare target groups, and more 
negative on unemployed people.   
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1. Introduction 
What people believe to be the economic, moral and social consequences of the welfare 
state is a nearly neglected subject in studies on welfare state legitimacy. This is quite re-
markable given that, as noted e.g. by Gough (2001),  the welfare state is often criticized 
substantially for its (alleged) consequences. From an economic perspective the welfare 
state is accused of, amongst others, being a fiscal burden seriously hampering investments, 
of endangering a national economy’s competitiveness by increasing labour costs, of mak-
ing labour markets too rigid and inflexible, and of sapping people’s will to work with re-
sulting negative effects for dependency rates and labour supply (e.g. Lindbeck, 1995). In 
the 1990’s, for instance, the concept of ‘Eurosclerosis’ was used to catch in one word all 
the (alleged) economic evils of the European Social Model (too costly, too rigid, creating 
dependency), explaining in one strike the higher structural European unemployment rates 
of that period compared to the USA (e.g. Henderson, 1993). From a moral and social per-
spective worries are expressed by neo-liberals and conservatives about people losing their 
sense of self-responsibility when being pampered by the welfare state, and about the de-
velopment of a culture of dependency (e.g. Murray, 1984). At the same time, christian-
democrats and communitarians often argue that social expenditures and comprehensive 
social programs 'crowd out' informal caring relations and social networks, as well as famil-
ial and communal systems of self-help and reciprocity, thereby fostering social isolation, 
anomie and self-centeredness (e.g. Etzioni, 1995). Recently, the welfare magnetism effect 
of the welfare state has been added to the list of its alleged negative consequences. Euro-
pean welfare states, and especially the ones among them with more generous provisions, 
would attract low-skilled migrants from poor countries aiming to improve their socio-
economic situation, and thus create problems concerning the economic sustainability and 
cultural legitimacy of national welfare states (Freeman, 1986; Soroka et al., 2004).  
Of course, whether and to what degree the negative consequences actually occur in 
reality is an important question for empirical research. Typically, empirical studies often 
find less alarming results than welfare state critiques assume.1 However, the point of the 
present paper is not whether the alleged consequences are real, as is the fact that a welfare 
state’s social legitimacy would be in serious jeopardy if large segments of a population 
                                                 
1  For example, risk investments seem to be higher in countries with higher social spending (Bird, 2001), 
there seems to be little relationship between replacement rates of unemployment benefits and unemployment 
duration (Atkinson, 1995), unemployment benefits do not seem to corrupt the work ethic (Barr, 1992; Gallie 
& Alm, 2000; Esser, 2005), while generally a process of Eurosclerosis has not taken place in European coun-
tries in the past decades (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). Regarding the moral and social consequences Euro-
pean studies found that provisions and pensions for elderly people do not undermine intra-family and inter-
generational solidaristic feelings and behavior (Kohli, 1999; Arber & Attias-Donfut, 2000; Knijn & Komter, 
2004), and welfare spending seems to be positively, not negatively, related to civic behavior, community 
participation, and concern for others (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2003; Van Oorschot et al., 2005). Regarding 
the welfare magnetism effect of European welfare states results from empirical studies do as yet contradict 
each other (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2003; Menz, 2004; Soroka et al., 2004). 
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would perceive them as being real. The problem at present is that there is hardly any 
knowledge about such perceptions of welfare state consequences.  
This paper aims to contribute to such knowledge by exploring and discussing de-
tailed empirical data from a 2006 Dutch survey where people were asked about their per-
ceptions of the possible positive and negative consequences of the Dutch welfare state. Of 
course, one can easily criticize a single country study in this field, because it is well imag-
inable that public perceptions of welfare consequences partly depend on characteristics of 
the welfare state that people actually live in. There are not only country differences in gen-
eral approaches to and actual types and levels of welfare provided, but also in actual out-
comes as e.g. regarding poverty and standards of living, and there are differences in socio-
demographic structures. All of these are factors that may influence people’s perceptions of 
welfare state consequences. Nevertheless, we feel that a single country study is valuable 
given the near complete lack of any knowledge in the field. The advantage of the data we 
avail of is that they come from a national survey that was specifically aimed at welfare 
attitudes, which means that for our analyses we can use a series of survey questions on 
consequences that are not available in any of the (European) comparative surveys at hand.2   
The empirical questions we will explore are: 1) How do Dutch people perceive 
positive and negative consequences of the welfare state?  2) Do people perceive positive as 
well negative consequences at the same time, and if so, is the overall balance positive or 
negative, and what is the degree of possible ambivalence? 3) What are the structural and 
cultural characteristics of people that determine their perceptions of consequences?  
Firstly, we will briefly review the empirical literature on welfare state legitimacy as 
measured with public opinion surveys and show that the perceived consequences are an as 
near as neglected aspect. Secondly, we will describe our methods and discuss the findings 
of our analyses. We round off with a brief summary and discussion of our results.  
  
                                                 
2 A major opportunity for cross-national and multi-level analyses of perceptions of welfare consequences will 
be offered by the data of the European Social Survey 2008, which will contain questions on the issue in its 
module on ‘Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe’. These data will come available in the autumn of 2009. 
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2. The social legitimacy of the welfare state 
A review of public opinion studies that explicitly aim to measure and analyse welfare state 
legitimacy shows that all but a few take as main indicators people’s opinions on what 
Roller (1995) has named the ‘range’ (or ‘extensity’) and ‘degree’ (or ‘intensity’) of the role 
of government (see table 1). The range regards the issue of whether government should or 
should not take up welfare responsibilities and in what range of policy areas, while the 
degree concerns the issue of whether government should spend little or much, or more or 
less on welfare provisions. Depending on data availability the studies vary in their exact 
focus of government responsibilities and spending issues. However, the majority of the 
‘range’ studies use data from the International Social Survey Programme’s modules on 
‘The Role of Government’, which asks people’s opinions on whether it should or should 
not be government’s responsibility to provide jobs, health care, decent standards of living 
for various groups, and such like. While the majority of the ‘degree’ studies use the mod-
ules’ question on whether people would want to see more or less government spending on 
various policy areas, including health, education, unemployment benefits and old age pen-
sions. Typically, the studies combine people’s opinions regarding the separate areas for 
responsibilities and spending into one scale to arrive at an overall measure of legitimacy of 
the welfare state.  
  
Table 1 Empirical welfare legitimacy studies by type of legitimacy indicator used 
 
Role of government 
 
Mixed scales 
Consequences of 
welfare 
Range 
Responsible for… 
Degree 
Spending on… 
  
 
(Andress & Heien, 2003) 
(Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) 
(Bonoli, 2000) 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2000) 
(Brooks & Manza, 2006) 
(Deitch, 2004) 
(Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001) 
(Haller et al., 1990) 
(Kluegel & Miyano, 1995) 
(Linos & West, 2003) 
(Papadakis & Bean, 1993) 
(Paugam, 2003) 
(Roller, 1995) 
(Svallfors, 1999) 
(Svallfors, 2003) 
(Gelissen, 2000)  
(Kluegel & Miyano, 1995) 
(Matheson & Wearing, 1999) 
(Meier Jaeger, 2007) 
(Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) 
(Edlund, 2007) 
 
 
(Blomberg, 1999)  
(Boeri et al., 2001) 
(Edlund, 2004) 
(Feagin, 1975) 
(Feldman & Steenbergen, 
2001) 
(Forma, 1997) 
(Haller et al., 1990) 
(Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989) 
(Papadakis & Bean, 1993) 
(Pettersen, 1995) 
(Sihvo & Uusitalo, 1995) 
(Gelissen, 2000) 
(Rehm, 2007) 
(Veghte et al., 2007) 
(Edlund, 2007)  
 
 
 
(Bryson, 1997) 
(Gidengil et al., 2003) 
(Sihvo & Uusitalo, 
1995) 
(Cnaan, 1989) 
(Svallfors, 1991) 
(Ploug, 1996) 
(Ervasti, 1998) 
(Goul Andersen, 1999) 
 
(Bryson, 1997) 
(Gidengil et al., 2003) 
(Sihvo & Uusitalo, 
1995) 
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There is some debate on which of the ISSP based indicators of range and degree 
could be best used (Svallfors, 1999), but the fact that they play a central role in empirical 
studies on welfare state legitimacy is understandable given that taking up responsibilities 
for welfare provision by governments is an essential characteristic of welfare states and a 
main reason for their existence. Notwithstanding this, the existing practice, with its focus 
on role-of-government indicators and sum scales measuring overall legitimacy, can be 
criticized for various reasons. One reason, which interests us here most, is that people’s 
opinions on the role of government is only one among a series of aspects of the welfare 
state people may have opinions about, and which may contribute to their overall perception 
of the welfare state’s legitimacy.3 The welfare state is a multi-dimensional institution im-
plying that it is likely that its social legitimacy cannot be captured in a single indicator that 
only reflects people’s preferences for the role of government. This multi-dimensionality 
and its implications for measuring welfare state legitimacy is readily acknowledged in the 
literature (Cnaan, 1989; Svallfors, 1991; Sihvo & Uusitalo, 1995; Gelissen, 2000; Andress 
& Heien, 2003)4, but as table 1 shows only a few empirical studies actually measure other 
than role-of-government based indicators.5 Some of them focus on a single alternative di-
mension of e.g. the practices of the welfare state with measures of people’s opinions on the 
bureaucratic character of their welfare state, on abuse of provisions, and on tax levels 
(Ervasti, 1998), while other studies analyse a broader range of dimensions. Some of these 
add up scores on dimensions to one single ‘welfarism’ scale (Bryson, 1997; Gidengil et al., 
2003), but the other studies analyse the dimensions separately. No standard practice has 
developed as to the type and number of dimensions to be included. In effect, the multiple 
dimensions that are actually distinguished vary strongly between studies. Given the many 
different perspectives on the functions and boundaries of the welfare state6, there is a risk 
that an exact and final definition of the various dimensions on which people may have 
opinions and which may contribute to their overall idea of the welfare state’s legitimacy 
will be a subject of endless debate. The important point is that the legitimacy of the welfare 
state does depend on people’s opinions on and perceptions of various aspects of it. People 
may well endorse a substantial role for government in providing welfare of various sorts 
                                                 
3  Other reasons are e.g.: a sum scale measurement over different welfare policy areas disregards the fact 
that people’s opinions on and preferences for welfare provision often depend on the type of provision and its 
target groups; asking about welfare preferences  without connecting these to costs involved over-estimates 
legitimacy. 
4  Sachweh et al. (2007) argue on results of a national German survey that also Rolller’s ‘range’ and ‘de-
gree’ dimensions of the role of government need to be seen as separate dimensions, because people’s opin-
ions on them have a very different structure of determinants. 
5  The fact that most of the role-of-government based studies are international comparative studies while 
most of the studies measuring legitimacy on multiple dimensions are national studies (from Finland, the UK, 
Denmark, Sweden, Canada, the US) suggests that the dominance of single dimension studies has more to do 
with practicalities of a lack of multi-dimensional questions in international comparative surveys (notably in 
the much used ISSP), than with theoretical or other substantial reasons.   
6  Note that Richard Titmuss, who invaluably contributed to our understanding of the welfare state, refers 
to the central subject of his scholarly life as an 'undefinable abstraction' (Titmuss, 1968, p. 124). 
 6 
and by various means, but at the same time they may be disappointed in what it costs (too 
high taxes), in how the welfare state functions in practice (too much misuse, too bureau-
cratic administrative practices, and such like), they may be disappointed in the outcomes of 
the welfare state (too much poverty, too large or too small inequality, too bad quality of 
services, etc.), and/or they may perceive serious negative consequences of welfare (drain 
on the economy, sapping the will to work, etc). 
 The brief review learns that welfare legitimacy is multi-dimensional, and that em-
pirical studies up till present mainly focus on the one dimension of the role of government. 
The dimension of the consequences of the welfare state, on which we focus here, figures in 
three studies only (Table 1), but in a minimalistic way. With no further analysis of deter-
minants, Gidengil et al. (2003) show that in 2000 38% of Canadian women and 30% of 
Canadian men disagree with the libertarian statement that ‘the welfare state makes people 
less willing to look after themselves’, while Bryson (1997) shows that in 1996 44% of re-
spondents of the British Social Attitude Survey agree with this same statement, and also 
that 33% agree with the related statement that ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous 
people would learn to stand on their own feet’. Sihvo and Uusitalo (1995) offer a first ex-
plorative insight in the determinants of consequence perceptions where they show that in 
1992 older, richer, more rightist, and higher class Fins more strongly feel that ‘social secu-
rity and welfare services have made people passive and reduced their initiative’. All in all, 
a meagre body of knowledge that we will try to extend here with an empirical description 
of how Dutch people perceive a series of positive and negative consequences of the Dutch 
welfare state; whether they perceive positive as well negative consequences at the same 
time, and if so: is the overall balance positive or negative, and what is the degree of possi-
ble ambivalence? In addition, we analyse and discuss the structural and cultural character-
istics of people that determine their perceptions of welfare state consequences. Before ex-
plaining our data and methods we will first discuss the determinants we will analyse. 
 
3. Determinants of consequences perceptions 
Regarding the analyses of determinants of consequences perceptions we apply an explor-
ative strategy, since this is an as near as untrodden field. We referred to the fact that Sihvo 
and Uusitalo (1995) are the first, and as far as we know, the only authors who offered some 
insight in such determinants. As mentioned earlier, in their Finnish study of 1992 they 
found that older, richer, more rightist, and higher class Fins more strongly felt that ‘social 
security and welfare services have made people passive and reduced their initiative’. In this 
list of characteristics we recognize the two sets of determinants, which in a variety of em-
pirical studies on welfare opinions have shown to play a role (see e.g. Hasenfeld & 
Rafferty, 1989; Groskind, 1994; Pettersen, 1995; Chong et al., 2001; Blekesaune & 
Quadagno, 2003), as is the case in a series of  theoretical studies on pro-social behaviour, 
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altruism and welfare support (Elster, 1990; Lindenberg, 1990; Mansbridge, 1990; Ther-
born, 1991; Kangas, 1997; Taylor-Gooby, 1998). On the one hand, there are structural 
characteristics of people, like age, income level and work status, which often indicate a 
degree of personal interest that people have in the benefits and services of the welfare state. 
A usual hypothesis, which is often corroborated to a degree, is that people with a stronger 
interest in social protection have more positive attitudes towards and positive perceptions 
of the arrangements and outcomes of the welfare state. From this perspective one could 
expect less critical perceptions of the negative economic and moral consequences of wel-
fare among those who usually depend more on the welfare state, like women7, older peo-
ple, people with lower incomes and/or more economic stress, people with lower educa-
tional level, employees in the public sector, unemployed people, and people who use or 
have been using social benefits generally. From the same perspective one could expect that 
these groups would be more positive about the social consequences, but perhaps more criti-
cal on migration consequences for reasons of a stronger felt economic competition with 
migrant workers. Migrants themselves, however, may be less critical towards the migration 
consequences.  
 On the other hand, there are cultural characteristics of people, that is, their welfare 
relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes that play a role in addition to interest factors. In our 
exploration of determinants we include a series of possibly relevant values and attitudes 
that are available in our data set. First and foremost there is people’s political stance, which 
has shown in many welfare opinion studies to play a role, in that leftist people tend to be 
more positive on all aspects of the welfare state. In accordance with this, and as Sihvo and 
Uusitalo (1995) found in their Finnish study, we expect that leftist people are less critical 
about the negative economic, moral and migration consequences, and more positive about 
the social consequences. However, since Lipset’s seminal study on class related values 
(Lipset, 1959), it is recognized and often proved that ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ attitudes tend to 
conceal a more fundamental division in two mostly un-related ideological domains: one 
regarding economic issues, which is about favouring equality or inequality, and one re-
garding cultural and moral issues, which is about favouring freedom or authority (for a 
review and discussion see: Houtman, 2003). These underlying dimensions may be impor-
tant here, since we analyse respondent’s answers to economic and moral consequences. We 
assume that egalitarian people are less critical on the economic consequences, and more 
positive on the social consequences of welfare, while we expect that authoritarian people 
will especially be critical about the moral consequences. Furthermore, with a view on the 
christian-democratic and communitarian critique on the welfare state, we expect that reli-
gious people are especially more critical about the moral consequences, compared to non-
religious people. We include religious denomination to see whether there is a difference in 
                                                 
7  See e.g. Deitch (2004). 
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moral welfare scepticism between various religious groupings, and we include frequency 
of attending religious meetings to see whether the intensity of people’s religious practices 
has an influence. Finally, since people’s ideas about the recipients of welfare often influ-
ence their welfare opinions (Gilens, 1996; Van Oorschot, 2006a), we include in our explo-
ration people’s attitudes to the deservingness of welfare target groups (like pensioners, 
single parents, sick and disabled people, etc.) in general, and to that of immigrants in par-
ticular. We also include the image people have of unemployed people. We expect more 
critical perceptions of economic, moral and immigration consequences among people who 
have less favourable attitudes towards welfare target groups and immigrants, and among 
people who have stronger negative images of unemployed people 
 
4. Data and methods 
Data 
Our data are from a national representative welfare opinions survey among the Dutch 
population of 16 years of age or older, which was held in October-November 2006. The 
total questionnaire was divided in three parts, which where put successively to all respon-
dents in three waves in the course of a six-week period. The sample was taken from a 
large, national representative panel (run by Center Data of Tilburg University, The Nether-
lands) and respondents filled out computer-based questionnaires on line. Of the 2682 se-
lected respondents 1972 filled in the sub-questionnaires of all three waves, and thus com-
pleted the total questionnaire, giving a response rate of 73%. In this group response group 
correction was necessary for some under-representation of younger people, people with 
lower educational level and people with lower income. In our analyses presented here we 
use the weighed data set, which contains 1941 cases. The Dutch Stichting Instituut Gak 
financed the survey. 
 
Dependent variables: perceived consequences 
In the survey people were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of eco-
nomic and moral criticisms of the welfare state that are commonly expressed in the Dutch 
media. The economic criticism that was put forward to respondents regards the idea that, 
because of their financing from pay roll taxes, welfare expenditures on Dutch social bene-
fits substantially increase the cost of labour and thus have a negative effect on the interna-
tional competitiveness of the Dutch economy, which in turn leads to structural unemploy-
ment and a general downturn of the national economy. Respondents were asked for their 
opinions on each of these elements separately. The moral criticisms referred to neo-liberal 
views that because of the welfare state people get lazy, and lose their sense of personal 
responsibility, as well as to the christian-democratic and communitarian views that the 
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welfare state makes people egoistic and calculative, and not willing to care for each other 
anymore. Typically, in the public debate the possible positive consequences of the welfare 
state are often little heard of.8 But to have a complete picture of the ‘consequences-based’ 
legitimacy of the welfare state it is also important to study whether and to what degree 
people acknowledge any positive effects. Therefore, respondents were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with a series of positively formulated social consequences: that, be-
cause of the welfare state, people in general live happier, wealth is distributed more justly, 
everybody gets a chance of making something of their life, large scale poverty and misery 
is prevented, societal unrest is prevented, and that the life of many is more pleasant and 
free. To this a single statement on the alleged ‘welfare magnetism’ phenomenon was 
added.   
 The answers to the four items on negative economic consequences were added to 
form a Likert-scale, which has an alpha reliability of .80. Higher scores indicate stronger 
perception of negative economic consequences. The answers to the four items on negative 
moral consequences were added to form a Likert-scale, with an alpha of .83. Higher scores 
indicate stronger perception of negative moral consequences. A factor and reliability 
analysis on six statements regarding positive social consequences revealed that three of 
them form a scale with alpha .80 (that because of the system of social benefits ...people in 
general live happier, ...wealth is distributed more justly, ...everybody gets a chance of mak-
ing something of their life). Higher scores on this scale indicate stronger perception of 
positive social consequences. The other three items on social consequences are not in-
cluded in the scale because of low inter-item correlations.  The statement about the migra-
tion consequences of the welfare state (because of the system of social benefits ...many 
foreigners come and live here) is included as a single variable, with higher scores indicat-
ing stronger perception of a welfare magnetism effect. 
 The four scales are inter-correlated. See the table below. The correlation between 
the economic and moral consequences scales is high (.722), which is why one would ex-
pect a closely similar structure of determinants for each. Notwithstanding, we analysed 
them separately, and found close similarity between the structure of their determinants, 
with some exceptions regarding the influence of gender, ethnicity and egalitarianism.  
 
Pearson correlations between consequences scales   
 Economic  
consequences 
Moral 
consequences 
Social  
consequences 
Migration  
consequences 
Economic  
consequences 
-    
Moral 
consequences 
.722* -   
                                                 
8  This is also true for the possible positive economic effects of the welfare state, like e.g. that social bene-
fits can function as buffers for up keeping consumption levels in times of recession, that pension savings are 
an important source of investment capital, that welfare services stimulate the development of human capital, 
etc. Unluckily, our survey data do not contain related statements. 
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Social 
consequences 
-.398* -.341* -  
Migration  
consequences 
.494* .543* -.262 - 
*P < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
 
Determinants 
The structural determinants included in our analyses are: sexe (1 = male, 2 = female); age 
(in years); income (net monthly income of household); economic stress (how hard respon-
dents perceive to manage on the household income: low stress-high stress); educational 
level (1-6: 1 = primary school, 2 = lower vocational, 3 = middle vocational, 4 = secondary 
school, 5 = higher vocational, 6 = university); work status (1 = employed private sector, 2 
= employed (semi) public sector, 3 = self-employed, 4 = unemployed, 5 = other (student, 
homemaker, pensioner, other), use of benefits (1 = respondent uses now and/or has used 
previously and/or expects to use in future an unemployment benefit and/or a disability 
benefit and/or sick pay and/or social assistance), ethnicity (0 = nonDutch (at least one par-
ent not born in the Netherlands), 1= Dutch).  
The cultural determinants are: political stance (self-placement on a 10-point scale: 
1 = most left and 10 = most right); religious denomination( 1 = none, 2 = catholic, 3 = 
protestant, 4 = evangelical, 5 = humanistic, 6 = Islamic, 7 = other); religious practice (how 
often one attends a religious meeting, apart from weddings and funerals: (1=more than 
once a week, 2=once a week, 3=once a month, 4=only on special occasions, 5=once a year, 
6=less frequent than once a year, 7=hardly ever, 8=never); egalitarianism (sum scale of 
answers to five statements: ...government has to increase social benefits, ...there is no real 
poverty in the Netherlands, ...large differences in income are unjust, ...government should 
take substantial measures to reduce income differences, ...companies must be obliged to 
share profits with their employees; alpha reliability = .78; low-high); authoritarianism 
(sum scale of answers to six statements: young people may have rebellious ideas, but they 
should return more conformist when they grow older, ...what we need are less laws and 
institutions, but more dedicated and energetic leaders, ...because of rapid social change it is 
difficult to tell good from bad, ... there are two kinds of people: strong and weak, ...our 
social problems would be solved if we could remove criminals from our society, ... things 
would be better if people would talk less and work harder: alpha reliability = .73: low-
high); deservingness general (sum scale of answers to the questions to what degree one 
would say that various groups would be entitled to social protection (10 point scale: 1 = 
not at all, 10 = very much): groups mentioned are pensioners. disabled persons, social as-
sistance clients, widows, sick people, unemployed people, people who cannot work, single 
parents, lowly educated people, people with poor health: alpha reliability = .85: low-high); 
deservingness of immigrants (sum scale of answers to four statements: ...non-western im-
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migrants should have less rights to social assistance than Dutch people, ... western immi-
grants should have less rights to social assistance than Dutch people, ... economic fugitives 
should have less rights to social assistance than Dutch people, ... political fugitives should 
have less rights to social assistance than Dutch people: alpha reliability = .92: low-high); 
beliefs about unemployed people (most unemployed people could have a job if they would 
want to, ... the work ethic of unemployed people is much lower than that of employed peo-
ple, ... unemployed people profit much more from the welfare state than employed people, 
... unemployed people should be grateful towards society for the benefits and services they 
receive, ... many unemployed people use benefits and services to which they are not enti-
tled: alpha reliability = .83; positive-negative). 
 
5. Results: The economic, moral and social consequences of the welfare state 
Positive and negative perceptions 
As table 2 shows the Dutch public do not strongly perceive negative economic conse-
quences of the welfare state. There are clear majorities of 45% and 51% respectively who 
do not agree that, because of the system of social benefits, unemployment would increase, 
or the economy would turn down, while there is a more or less equal divide over its effect 
on labour costs and the international competitiveness of the Dutch economy. There is also 
a divide regarding the negative moral consequences, although in all cases those who do 
perceive such consequences form a small majority, ranging between 32% and 40%. Re-
garding the positive social consequences, however, there are clear majorities agreeing 
(ranging from 46% to 65%). Finally, a majority of 52% of the Dutch population perceives 
a welfare magnet effect, that is, they agree with the idea that many foreigners come and 
live in the Netherlands because of the system of social benefits.  
 
Table 2. “The system of welfare benefits can have positive and negative consequences. 
Do you agree or disagree with the statement that because of the system of social bene-
fits:…” (%) 
 (totally)  
disagree 
agree, 
nor 
disagree 
(totally) 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
Economic consequences 
 
    
…labour costs are too high 23 34 33 10 
…unemployment increases 45 28 18 9 
…the competitiveness of the Dutch economy de-
creases 36 26 23 15 
…the economy turns down 51 30 9 10 
Average 39 29 21 11 
Moral consequences 
 
    
…people get lazy  28 28 40 4 
…people get egoistic and calculative 31 30 32 7 
…people are not willing to care for each other any-
more 
29 28 36 7 
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…people lose their sense of personal responsibility 30 27 39 5 
Average 30 28 37 6 
Social consequences 
 
    
…large scale poverty and misery is prevented 10 20 65 6 
…societal unrest is prevented 13 28 51 8 
…wealth is distributed more justly 19 25 50 6 
…the life of many is more pleasant and free 12 32 48 8 
…everybody gets a chance of making something of 
their life 
11 28 56 5 
…people in general live happier 15 31 46 8 
Average 30 27 53 7 
Migration consequences 
     
…many foreigners come and live here 20 22 53 7 
 
 
Clearly, the moral criticisms on the welfare state appeal more to the Dutch public, than the 
economic criticisms.9 However, the most revealing finding from table 2 is that, despite the 
fact that the positive consequences of the welfare state are rarely emphasized in the public 
debate, large segments of the Dutch public nevertheless have a clear eye for them. As fur-
ther calculations showed, it is even the case that for a large majority of 67% the positive 
social consequences outweigh the negative economic, moral and migration conse-
quences.10 It is known that for decades on end support for the welfare state is invariably 
high in the Netherlands, since this is measured annually by the Dutch Social and Cultural 
Planning Bureau over a period from 1970 onwards (Becker, 2005). Elsewhere we sug-
gested that Dutch welfare popularity can be understood from the fact that no less than 70% 
of the Dutch experience a direct interest in the system of social benefits covering the risks 
of unemployment, sickness, disability and poverty, because either they themselves or fam-
ily members and close friends actually receive such benefits, or they have received them in 
the past (Van Oorschot, 2006b). To this broad, interest based cornerstone of Dutch welfare 
legitimacy, another can be added now: the fact that in the eyes of a large majority of the 
Dutch population the positive consequences of their welfare system outweigh the negative 
ones. Presumably, the overall positive perception of the system’s consequences is related 
to the fact that so many profit from it. However, one would need cross-national compara-
tive data to test this relationship, that is, to see whether overall positive ‘consequences-
based’ welfare legitimacy could also be present (to a degree) in the context of a less en-
compassing, more selective welfare state. 
 Although a positive balance between positive and negative perceptions can be 
seen as a necessary condition for a ‘consequence based’ legitimacy of the welfare state, 
                                                 
9  We should note that apparently people had more difficulty in responding to the economic consequences 
items, compared to the other items, given that the proportions of  ‘don’t knows’ generally are larger in the 
first case.  
10  We subtracted the average of respondent’s scores on the negatively formulated items regarding the eco-
nomic, moral and migration consequences, from the average of scores on the positively formulated social 
consequences: the balance was positive in 67% of cases, zero in 4% of cases, and negative in 30% of cases.  
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such legitimacy will also depend on the degree of ambivalence among the population at 
large. That is, the overall balance may be positive, but the legitimacy would be more frag-
ile to the degree that people more closely combine positive as well as negative perceptions 
at the same time11. We have measured the degree of ambivalence in consequences percep-
tions as the percentages of people who on average score higher than three 12on the positive 
social consequences items, and who score on average higher then three as well on the 
negative economic, moral and migration consequences items. We found that 10% of all 
respondents combine high scores on the positive social consequences and on the negative 
economic consequences, 22% combine high scores on the positive social and the negative 
moral consequences, and 28% combines high scores on the social and migration conse-
quences. Although we have no data from other sources to compare these results with, we 
are inclined to conclude that these percentages reflect modest levels of ambivalence.  
 
                                                 
11  Attitudinal ambivalence is usually defined as a person’s combination of positive and negative evalua-
tions of a single attitude subject (Priester & Petty, 1996). 
12   On the 1-5 agreement-scale. 
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Determinants of perceptions 
 To analyse determinants we have regressed the set of structural variables (model 1), and a 
combination of the structural and cultural variables (model 2) on the four consequences 
scales. The results of the multivariate regressions are summarized in table 3.  
 Rather strikingly, what table 3 shows first is that the structural variables (Models 
1) hardly explain any part of the variance of the consequences perceptions. Admittedly, 
some effects are visible: people with a higher educational level, those who are employed in 
the public sector and those who make, or have made use, of social benefits are less critical 
about the consequences (that is, they agree less with the negative consequences, and agree 
more with the positive consequences). However, these effects total up to very modest per-
centages of explained variance (ranging from 2.0% to 4.4%), but most importantly, they 
disappear in the Models 2 where the cultural variables are added. What remains in the 
Models 2 is that people with higher incomes and those with work status ‘other’ (consisting 
of students, pensioners and housewives) agree more with the positive social consequences 
of welfare. Typically, when controlling for cultural variables the difference between men 
and women becomes significant, in that women on average perceive negative economic 
and migration consequences a bit more than men, while they perceive the positive social 
consequences a bit less. How this female pessimism can be explained is a puzzle, since the 
Models 2 control for the cultural variables as well as for a series of other structural vari-
ables, and usually it is found that women are stronger supporters of the welfare state than 
men (see e.g. Deitch, 1988; Gidengil et al., 2003).13 In one case also the age effect be-
comes statistically significant in the Models 2: older people are less in agreement with the 
positive social consequences. Ethnicity only plays a role with regard to the morality issue: 
people who have at least one foreign born parent generally agree more with the negative 
moral consequences.  
 
                                                 
13  This finding may reflect that people may think differently about the good or bad of the welfare state as a 
whole, and about its consequences, which actually is the explicit assumption of this paper. Preliminary fur-
ther analyses of the Dutch 2006 survey data corroborate this assumption, since first analyses show that the 
correlations between consequences scales and scales measuring general welfare state support are positive, but 
low (in the range of .10 - .20). 
 15 
Table 3. Multivariate regression results: determinants of perceived conse-
quences 
(Beta-coefficients) 
 
 Negative eco-
nomic conse-
quences 
Negative  
moral conse-
quences 
Positive  
social conse-
quences 
Negative mi-
gration conse-
quences 
 Model 
1 
 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
 
Model 
2 
Sexe (M-F) ,032 ,061** ,013 ,037 -,074** -,098** ,026 ,058** 
Age -,035 ,001 -,020 ,021 -,017 -,065** -,023 ,029 
Income -,001 ,002 ,031 ,032 ,067** ,062** ,032 ,038 
Economic stress -,041 -,004 -,047 -,012 -,017 -,047 ,008 -,001 
Educational level -,099** ,005 -,122** -,004 ,073** ,017 -,129** -,016 
Work status         
Employed private sector*         
Employed public sector -,080** -,028 -,091** -,039 ,061** ,011 -,097** -,025 
Self-employed ,006 -,019 ,016 -,006 ,043 ,049 -,019 -,037 
Unemployed -,041 ,021 -,106** -,041 ,033 -,010 -,056* -,002 
Other -,058 -,037 -,065 -,040 ,135** ,102** -,012 ,023 
Use of benefits -,072** -,013 -,110** -,043 ,037 -,015 -,051 ,003 
Ethnicity (nonNL-NL) ,018 ,013 -,058** -,074** -,028 -,022 ,023 ,006 
Religious denomination         
None*         
(Roman) Catholic - -,009 - -,012 - -,021 - ,001 
Protestant - -,005 - -,019 - -,015 - -,038 
Evangelical - -,020 - -,050 - -,014 - ,002 
Humanistic - ,000 - -,017 - ,011 - -,029 
Islamic - ,012 - -,033 - -,037 - -,026 
Other - ,010 - -,012 - ,016 - -,015 
Religious practice - ,018 - -,014 - -,063* - -,007 
Political stance (L-R) - ,069** - ,075** - -,073** - ,099** 
Egalitarianism - -,085** - -,024 - ,072** - -,043 
Authoritarianism - ,258** - ,235** - -,031 - ,094** 
Deservingness general - -,151** - -,192** - ,225** - ,036 
Deservingness immigrants - -,070** - -,092** - ,175** - -,407** 
Negative beliefs  
re. unemployed 
- ,225** - ,267** - -,012 - ,158** 
         
Adjusted Rsquared .020 .319 .044 .385 .020 .187 .032 .354 
*: reference category 
**: significant p <.01 
 
 
The very modest role of the structural variables suggests that perceptions of welfare conse-
quences are hardly related to people’s personal interests in the welfare state. That is, as far 
as such interests would follow from social risk factors like people’s income level, work 
status and educational level. This interpretation is enforced by the absence of effects from 
more direct interest indicators, like people’s economic stress, use of social benefits, and 
being unemployed or not. However, two remarks seem warranted. Firstly, social risk fac-
tors and related personal interests in welfare benefits and services may have an indirect 
effect on consequence perceptions to the degree that they determine people’s ideas and 
values reflected in our set of cultural variables. To check for this we have regressed sepa-
rately our cultural variables on the set of structural variables and found indications for 
some such indirect effects (for reasons of space we do not present the complete tables), like 
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for instance: people working in the public sector and people with lesser financial means are 
more leftist; people who experience more economic stress, who are unemployed and those 
with lower education are more egalitarian; older people, and especially lower educated 
people are more authoritarian; people with greater benefit use and more economic stress 
regard welfare target groups, including immigrants, as more deserving; and, older people, 
unemployed people and people with lower education have less negative images of unem-
ployed people. However, the totals of such effects add up to small proportions of explained 
variance of less than 10%. In other words, the indirect effects of risk factors on perceptions 
of welfare consequences, via people’s values and beliefs, are small. Secondly, again, our 
findings may be typical for an encompassing welfare state as the Dutch one is, where large 
groups of people and their close relatives and friends are entitled to social benefits and 
services - in the past, now, or expectedly in future - which could make that perceptions of 
welfare interest do not vary that strongly among categories of the Dutch population. In a 
1995 Dutch study we also found little or no effects of structural variables on people’s wel-
fare solidarity opinions (Van Oorschot, 2000), and the longitudinal welfare opinion data of 
the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau consistently show small effects from struc-
tural variables over a period of three decades (Becker, 2005). The finding is not particu-
larly Dutch, though. Also Sihvo and Uusitalo conclude in their Finnish study that the dif-
ferences in opinions on welfare consequences that they find to exist between population 
groups ‘are in quantitative terms quite small’ (Sihvo & Uusitalo, 1995;221). And a survey 
of welfare opinions in Denmark led to the same conclusion (Ploug, 1996). Typically, like 
The Netherlands, both Finland and Denmark have comprehensive welfare systems. In 
short, the main conclusion from table 3 is that among Dutch people perceptions of welfare 
consequences are hardly related to their structural positions, if at all. They are, however, 
related to other variables.  
 As for the cultural variables, table 3 shows, rather unexpectedly, that people’s 
religious denomination and intensity of religious practice have no significant effects, not 
even on perceptions of moral consequences. Political stance, however, does have effects, 
which are in expected directions: leftist people are less pessimistic about the economic, 
moral and immigration consequences of the welfare state, and at the same time they are 
more optimistic on the positive social consequences, compared to more rightist people. As 
expected, we also see that egalitarian people are less critical about the economic conse-
quences and more positive about the social consequences, while there is no effect of egali-
tarianism on perceptions of moral and immigration consequences. More authoritarian peo-
ple, as expected, are more critical on the moral consequences, but the table 3 shows that 
they also are more critical on the economic and migration consequences. It seems, there-
fore, that authoritarian people tend to be more anti-welfarist generally, which would be in 
line with for instance Cozarelli et al. (2001), who found that authoritarian Americans are 
more inclined to attribute poverty to personal characteristics of the poor themselves in 
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stead of to external, social-structural factors. Such victim-blaming is often linked to an 
anti-welfare sentiment (Kluegel & Miyano, 1995).What becomes clear from table 3 is that, 
also as expected, people’s perceptions of welfare consequences are strongly related to the 
variables that reflect their ideas on the specific target groups of welfare. Those who score 
lower on the general deservingness variable, which are people who are less generous in 
granting social protection rights to needy groups (like unemployed people, sick and dis-
abled people, single parents, and social assistance claimants) are also those who are more 
pessimistic about the economic and moral consequences, than people who are more gener-
ous. At the same time they are less optimistic about the social consequences. People’s 
ideas on the deservingness of immigrants also play a role, especially with regard to the 
perception of migration consequences. As expected, people who regard immigrants as less 
deserving, perceive a higher ‘welfare magnetism’ effect. The effects of negative images of 
unemployed people are quite strong. Negative images are associated with more negative 
perceptions of welfare consequences. Of course, one can question the causal direction as 
our regression model assumes it: that deservingness attitudes and beliefs about unem-
ployed people influence perceptions of welfare consequences. One could also argue for a 
reversed causality where people’s worries about the consequences of the welfare state lead 
to a more restraint position on granting rights to social protection and to stronger doubts on 
the trustworthiness of unemployed people. Another possibility could even be that both fac-
tors are not directly causally related, but in stead are mutually influenced by a broader un-
derlying (pro- or anti-) welfarism attitude. Regrettably, our cross-sectional data do not al-
low exploring the causal relationship further, but it is an important point for future re-
search.  
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
What people believe to be the economic, moral and social consequences of the welfare 
state is a nearly neglected subject in studies on welfare state legitimacy. This is quite re-
markable given that the welfare state is often criticized substantially for its (alleged) eco-
nomic and moral consequences. Here we contributed to the field by offering a first descrip-
tion of people’s perceptions of a series of welfare state consequences, and explorative 
analyses of some structural and cultural determinants of these perceptions. Data from a 
2006 Dutch survey show that in the eyes of a large majority of the Dutch the positive so-
cial consequences of the welfare state outweigh the negative economic and moral conse-
quences. Strikingly, structural variables, like age, income and educational level, which may 
indicate peoples’ social risks and related personal interest in the provisions of the welfare 
state, play a minor role, if at all, compared to cultural variables. Most pessimistic about the 
economic and moral consequences, and least optimistic about the social consequences, are 
women, rightist people, authoritarian people, people who attribute less deservingness to 
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welfare target groups and who have more negative images of unemployed people. In addi-
tion, egalitarian people perceive more negative economic consequences and less positive 
social consequences. 
 Clearly, a single country analyses like ours, in an underdeveloped field of study, 
raises the question of the generalizability of results. We would not want to claim that our 
results could be generalized, over time nor over place, since there are no comparative stud-
ies as yet, which use a similar series of statements about economic, moral and social con-
sequences. Even from a Dutch national perspective our results could be rather typical for 
the year 2006 in which the survey was conducted, compared to for instance the 1980s, 
when the Dutch welfare state was in a deep fiscal crisis, and unemployment rates were 
about three times as high as in 2006. It could be that people’s perceptions of the economic 
consequences where much more negative then, than we have seen to be the case for 2006. 
It could also be that perceptions of the migration consequences where less pessimistic in 
the 1980s, because the issue of welfare magnetism and problems of the multi-cultural soci-
ety where not that strongly on the Dutch socio-political agenda as they are nowadays. The 
point is that macro-level social factors of various kinds may affect the ideas people have 
about the consequences of the welfare state, and that one would need comparative data 
over time to analyse their influence. The same kind of argument holds when one adopts a 
cross-national perspective. Our findings may be typical Dutch. In the paper we already 
alluded to the possible influence of the fact that the Dutch welfare state is relatively com-
prehensive. Even after a period of serious restructuring, which set in in the 1980s, in a 
global and European comparative perspective it still covers a broad range of social risks 
and needs among large segments of the population. This may help in understanding that for 
most Dutch people the positive social consequences outweigh the negative economic and 
moral consequences. Comparative data from other countries, with smaller or higher de-
grees of ‘welfare stateness’, would be needed to show whether the size and type of the wel-
fare state people live in affects their ideas about welfare state consequences.  
 Finally, we have claimed that welfare state legitimacy is multi-dimensional, since 
people may think differently about the various dimensions and aspects of the welfare state. 
We tend to doubt, therefore, that one single or composite indicator can capture welfare 
state legitimacy. Of course, this is also true for the indicator we studied here: people’s per-
ceptions of positive and negative consequences of the welfare state. Interesting for future 
study is to see how different indicators, regarding e.g. perceptions of the role of govern-
ment, implementation practices, the costs, and actual outcomes of the welfare state, would 
relate to each other, and to perceptions of consequences. We would especially be interested 
to see whether there is empirical ground for a concept like ‘welfarism’, or its counterpart 
‘anti-welfarism’, which is sometimes used in the literature to refer to a general and rather 
basic positive or negative attitude people may have to any welfare related issue. At some 
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points in the presentation and interpretation of our findings we have alluded to the possible 
existence of such an overall attitude dimension. 
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